Foreword: Equality, the Elusive Value by Dixon, Robert G., Jr.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1979 
Issue 1 Symposium: The Quest for Equality 
1979 
Foreword: Equality, the Elusive Value 
Robert G. Dixon Jr. 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert G. Dixon Jr., Foreword: Equality, the Elusive Value, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 005 (1979). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/4 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
FOREWORD
EQUALITY, THE ELUSIVE VALUE
ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.*
Of all the visitors to our shores, the gifted Frenchman, de Toc-
queville, would best understand the theme of Washington University's
"Quest for Equality" series. In his Democracy in America, penned al-
most 150 years ago,' he proclaimed that democratic communities have
.,a natural taste for freedom. . they will seek it, cherish it, and view
any privation of it with regret. But for equality, their passion is ardent,
insatiable, incessant, invincible." 2 And de Tocqueville would under-
stand the term "quest." He may not have comprehended that it is eas-
ier to develop a psychological sense of what he observed as the
-'equality of condition,"3 yielding a species of camaraderie across class
lines, than to "accomplish" equality or even define its relation to effort,
gain, reward, and obligation. But he did see a century before Myrdal4
the qualifying dilemma of race; and if he understandably failed to fore-
see all of its unfolding complexity, he did note its intensity-even hy-
pothesizing the possibility of race war in the South.5
In more timeless perspective, of the three great recurring themes in
Western legal and political philosophy-liberty, justice, and equal-
ity-the equality concept, as I have noted elsewhere,6 always has been
the most complex. People are obviously unequal in talent and charac-
ter- conditions and opportunities are infinitely varied; and all societies
seem naturally to develop into a structure of position and preferment.
People look upward seeking equality, downward claiming privilege.
* Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., 1943, Ph.D., 1947,
Syracuse University; J.D., 1956, George Washington University. Assistant Attorney General in
,harge of the Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice, 1973-74.
1. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
2. 2 id. at 97.
3. 1 id. at 3.
4. A. MYRDAL, TOWARDS EQUALITY (1971).
5. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 391-92.
6. Dixon, The Supreme Court and EqualiQ': Legislative Classifications, Desegregation, and
Re'erse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 494, 494 (1977) (book manuscript in preparation).
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Equality is our most elusive value, with a varied background in natural
law, Christian theology, and democratic theory. A certain modicum of
equality is a precondition of a free society, yet in most philosophic
thought since Aristotle it has not been an absolute. Aristotle wrapped
equality into his concept of distributive justice, transmuting equality
into a concern for treating persons alike only insofar as they share like
qualities, rather than imposing equality of result on all.7
In America there has been a special tension, indeed a tragic tension
not resolved, between the ideals of equality of opportunity and individ-
ualism and the reality of black slavery and its aftermath. The "Quest
for Equality" in our constitutional order, although not exclusively con-
cerned with racial matters, is heavily influenced by issues of discrimi-
nation and corrective action. In pursuit of the traditional ideal of
equality of opportunity, and of the newer claims for an equality of re-
sults, detailed court orders often dominate such fields as school deseg-
regation, employment, welfare administration, and even the political
process itself.'
In school desegregation, for example, the important events follow the
initial substantive ruling of unconstitutionality, and in these events
courts stay deeply involved. As courts cast about for equitable solu-
tions, the complex remedy may overshadow the seemingly simple sub-
stantive right that provided the basis for judicial entre.
Despite some ambiguous phrases in Brown v. Board of Education,'
the orthodox desegregation theory holds that the Constitution forbids
official acts of racial segregation but does not confer a substantive right
to racial balance in all schools. Yet courts temporarily order integra-
tive busing as a means of dismantling an officially segregated system.
The distinction between these two concepts becomes blurred as the ini-
tially required proof of school board wrongdoing becomes more subtle,
7. ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in 9 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1131-32 (W. Ross ed.
1925).
8. All of these, except legislative representation, have been included in the symposium. For
a preview of one developing issue, the interaction of constitutional considerations with the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1976), see Note, Group Representation andRace.
Conscious Apportionment: The Roles of States and the Federal Courts, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1847
(1978). See also R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
POLITIcs 7-22, 456-99, 503-27 (1968); Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards of
Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. I.
9. Compare "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954), with "[s]uch an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which




i.e., as culpability becomes based not upon overt segregation laws, but
np-in board policies concerning the location of new schools and the
arrangement of attendance lines. To correct these more subtle forms of
Ncgregation, remedial busing orders remain in force indefinitely.
By 1978 it appeared that some lower courts viewed racial imbalance
per se as a substantive wrong, or at least as nearly conclusive proof of a
constitutional violation on the part of school officials.' 0 On this issue
sharp conflict emerged between the lower federal courts and the
Supreme Court." If the Supreme Court some day should view racial
imbalance in schools, however caused, as a constitutional violation,
then to what extent would America have embraced a kind of "ethnic
proportionality" principle without explicit debate, and how broadly in
our society would the principle apply?
The newest conflict in constitutional equality values, illustrated by
the Bakke' 2 and Weber 3 cases, is individual rights versus group rights.
In Bakke, by means of a cryptic judgment unsupported by any major-
ity opinion, the Court seemed to frown on achieving group preference
in professional school admissions through use of an overt double stan-
dard for blacks and some other selected minorities. But it left quite
murky the extent to which some ethnic considerations might validly be
used in allocating scarce resources where such considerations are rele-
vant to the purpose or function of an institution.
It is understandable that major interindividual and intergroup ten-
sions should be associated with litigation under the "equal protection
of the laws" concept because "equality" is the most amorphous of our
constitutional principles, and some facets of its meaning are in internal
conflict. How broad should be the presumption that all men are cre-
10. E.g, Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), vacatedper curiam, 433 U.S.
677, remanded, 566 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380
5th Cir. 1976); United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 946 (1975); Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974).
11. Compare the Supreme Court's insistence on proof of intentional segregative acts of
,Chool authorities and consequent segregative effects, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
-V)6 (1977); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), with the Sixth
Criuit's response to Dayton in Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1978), which contin-
uzd to infer systemwide school board discrimination from racial imbalance and policies affecting
o'nly certain grades and schools. The Supreme Court again granted review. Dayton Bd. of Educ.
Brinkman, cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-627).
12. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted
49 S Ct 720 11978) (No. 78-435)
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ated "equal"? Is the principle satisfied by abolishing privileges of sta-
tus based on class? Should the approach be even more individualized
by adding restrictions on inherited wealth to equalize starting points?
Under the latter approach, would it follow that extra benefits should be
provided for the slow starter? What then of subsequent inequalities
due to extra effort and ability? When should a person (or group) be
viewed as "on his (or its) own"? What is the impact on incentives of a
system of equalization? Some of these quite different meanings of
equality are implied in such phrases as "equality of opportunity" or
"equality of results," but never very clearly.
In our legal and constitutional order, particularly as we have devised
remedies for racial discrimination (or racial "nonproportionality" ef-
fected by a multiplicity of causes), the "equal protection of the laws"
concept frequently operates as an "allocational right." It arouses ani-
mosity in those disfavored by the allocations. With limited resources,
any change in favor of one person or group harms the beneficiaries of
the preceding allocation. The harm to the individual is the same
whether the status quo ante was "natural" or governmentally
supported.
Put in terms of modern social science, "equality" is a zero-sum game
whenever resources are finite and insufficient to meet demands. One
person's gain is another person's loss. This factor does not operate with
full force in elementary and secondary public school desegregation be-
cause no one is totally deprived of an education. The impact of pupil
reassignment is instead on location and quality of education. The zero-
sum factor does operate unavoidably in affirmative action programs
that feature race preference in college admissions, employment, and
some housing programs. The Bakke decision, even if limited, and the
pending Weber decision may have a major impact on the federal civil
rights legislation and executive orders that form the foundation for
most of our affirmative action programs.
Evolving concepts of equality, in addition to posing difficult choices
in allocation and in completion of desegregation, have stimulated a
prolonged drive for a new substantive constitutional amendment, the
sex-focused "equal rights" amendment (ERA). Because the status of
women appears to be in the process of being substantially equalized in
federal programs under the aegis of the equal protection principle, the
additional substantive impact of ERA is quite uncertain. One notewor-




unlike our past constitutional guarantees the Equal Rights Amendment
is not phrased explicitly in terms of "personal rights."
The fifth and fourteenth amendments both specifically protect "any
person" 4 against denial of due process or equal protection at the hands
of the federal or state governments. The ERA, in contrast, states that
"equality of rights," whatever that term may come to mean, shall not
be abridged by the federal or state governments on account of sex.
Even under the specific "any person" language of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, arguments have been made to subordinate per-
sonal rights to group rights, ie., to devise goals or quotas in various
activities to bring about more nearly proportionate representation of
various groups. Cases like Bakke 5 and Weber,6 in which plaintiffs
argue that their personal rights have been overridden to help members
of certain groups,sharply raise the issue in constitutional terms under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments and in statutory terms under Ti-
tles VI,' 7 VII,'8 and IX 19 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended.
Hence, a question perhaps more important than many of those raised
in the highly emotional disputes over ERA may be ERA's relationship
to, and impact on, the emerging personal rights-group rights conflict in
American constitutional law. Specifically, would it be easier or harder
to justify an overt sexual preference hiring quota under the ERA (per-
haps based on a theory of compensating women for past restrictions of
opportunity) than under the equal protection principles in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments?
Also on the equality frontier are novel theories for creating some
constitutional constraints on governmental choices, or governmental
nonaction, in the fields of welfare and basic services. The conceptual
problem centers on the feasibility of creating some intermediate affirm-
ative obligations for government without sliding into the explosive con-
cept of rights that must be supported.
Under the impact of modern developments in the quest for equality,
two aged topics take on fresh meaning. One is the question of the con-
tinuing importance of the traditional public-private spheres dichotomy
14. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
15. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
16. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
99 S. Ct. 720 (1978) (No. 78-435).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
19, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (1976)
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when equality values collide with individuality and privacy. In consti-
tutional parlance the question is whether there still must be a showing
of "state action" before the Constitution can be invoked against the
challenged practice. The other topic concerns the proper role of the
courts, participating primarily through constitutional review, in sharing
the travail of society and the quest for a better order.
Traditionally, judicial review has taken the form of negating statutes
and executive acts that transcend the authorized power of government
or that impinge on personal guarantees. Examples include the invali-
dation of New Deal legislation in the 1930's and the expanding scope
of first amendment limitations on governmental power. Under modem
judicial review, largely founded on the "equal protection of the laws"
principle, however, a court judgment does not so much terminate a pro-
gram adopted by the political branches as begin a period of substitute
"administration by judges." Courts restructure the offending institu-
tion's program and sometimes restructure government itself. Well
known examples include school desegregation, management of state
prisons and hospitals, and legislative redistricting.
This development raises troublesome jurisprudential questions con-
cerning the adequacy of the courts' information base, the clarity of gui-
dance from the constitutional text, the tension between judicial power
and popular control of government, and the ability of judges to take on
the tasks of program administration and governmental reorganization.
Truly, the "equal protection of the laws" principle, which Justice
Holmes characterized fifty years ago as the "last resort of constitutional
argument,"2" has emerged as the most dynamic-and perhaps the most
unruly--constitutional principle.
20. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927),
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